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silencing, also explaining loss of thermo-
regulatory and locomotor control during
this state. Cortical activation during REM
sleepwould have emerged later to sustain
other functions, most likely for cognitive
processing.
Based on this study and others, it is
increasingly likely that SWA involves
some form of local restoration through
synaptic plasticity changes at least for
cortical circuits, a major feature of human
brain architecture. As one of the major
functions of the cortex is learning and
memory, much of its synaptic organiza-
tion may be more influenced by prior
activity than by circadian modulation. In
this model, circadian modulation of syn-
aptic organization may be more essential
to the regulation of other, noncortical,
non-memory-forming circuits. The finding
that cortical unit activity changes with
sleep debt independently of sleep and
wake suggests that extended wakeful-
ness has a cost for individual cortical neu-
rons, in support of the synaptic homeo-
stasis theory proposed by the authors.
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A key feature of an adaptive decisionmakingmechanism is its ability to guide behavior even in new situations.
In this issue of Neuron, Kumaran et al. report that conceptual representations, which allow generalization
from one situation to another through their shared features, can guide decisions even when new problems
are encountered via the hippocampus.Everyone has an intuitive sense of what it
means to make a decision, and it is
perhaps for this reason that some scien-
tists’ careful investigations into decision
making appear to some to lack a critical
component—an account of how deci-
sions are made in novel situations. Ac-
cording to the new findings presented
by Kumaran and colleagues (2009) in
this issue of Neuron, the ability to
exploit information gained in one context
when making decisions in a new con-
text may depend on the hippocampus
and on the way that it interactswith the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC).
Recent years have seen a great blos-
soming of interest in the brain mecha-
nisms of decision making. It has been
suggested that a ‘‘standard model’’ of
decision making is beginning to emerge
from the abundance of data, much of
it from functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) studies of the human brain
(Kable and Glimcher, 2009). In such
models the vmPFC is assigned a pre-
eminent role because activity in this
region is often correlated with the valueNeuron 63,of the choice that is being taken by a
subject (Tanaka et al., 2004). Some of
the progress is due to the widespread
adoption of computational accounts of
reinforcement based learning that make
quantitative predictions about values of
choices on a trial-by-trial basis. It is just
such quantitative predictions about value
that have been correlated with vmPFC
fMRI signals.
Typically, decision-making experiments
ask subjects to choose between a limited
number of responses, normally just two,
again and again, sometimes for moreSeptember 24, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 721
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Previewsthan a hundred occasions.
Sometimes the values of the
different options may switch
or gradually change. Repeti-
tion makes it possible to reli-
ably identify neural activity
associated with the decision
process, but such information
comes at the cost of not being
able to see how decisions are
made in new situations. For
many, it is this feature of
decision making that is so
intriguing.
It is possible to make a
good decision even in a
new environment if you can
identify features in it that
remind you of features of
past decision contexts, and
this is possible when an
organism possesses what some philoso-
phers call ‘‘conceptual representations.’’
For some philosophers (Shea et al.,
2008) conceptual representations are
very specific types of representations
composed of semantic constituents—
parts that themselves have a meaning.
By contrast, nonconceptual representa-
tions can have quite complex meanings
but their constituent parts do not each
carry components of that meaning. For
example, the meaning of representations
such as flags and some road signs is not
entailed by their component constituents.
To try and tackle whether and how
conceptual representations might guide
decisionmaking, Kumaran and colleagues
(2009) designed a weather prediction task
in which subjects had to choose between
one of two options each framed as a
weather prediction (sun or rain). A com-
posite image composed of fractal patterns
shown to them on a computer monitor
was all that they had to guide them. Any
two of four fractal stimuli could be paired
to formone of eight unique visual patterns.
During the initial learning session, each
pattern was deterministically associated
with a weather prediction and an incentiv-
izing outcome (money won or lost for
correct or incorrect predictions, respec-
tively). While participants could simply
learn to associate each individual pat-
tern with the correct response, they
could also learn to abstract commonalities
between individual patterns based on
either spatial or nonspatial information to
predict the correct response. For instance,
they could learn that fractal 1 predicts
sun when on the left and rain when on
the right, irrespective of the central fractal
with which it is paired (spatial concept),
whereas fractal 2 predicts sun when
paired with fractal 3 and rain when paired
with fractal 4, irrespective of its spatial
location (nonspatial concept). Using such
abstract rules to guide responding should
theoretically mitigate the computational
demand required to form accurate predic-
tions in this task.
The first finding was that, in this situa-
tion, the subjects’ learning was not best
accounted for by a standard Rescorla
Wagner reinforcement-learning model
that has proved successful in describing
activity in brain regions such as the stria-
tum and dopaminergic system during
reward guided learning. In this approach,
inferences about when learning occurs
are based upon the perspective of the
subject executing the task and thus data
up to the current trial. Instead, Kumaran
and colleagues (2009) found that a state-
space model (Smith et al., 2004), that
has been used to describe behavioral
changes associated with medial temporal
activity (Wirth et al., 2003), produced
a better fit to subject choices. The ap-
proach takes the perspective of an ideal
observer, basing estimates of the learning
state process at each trial upon observing
the outcomes of all of the trials in the
experiment. One reason for the superior
performance of the state-space model
may be its ability to detect
abrupt changes in learning
that do not necessarily reflect
standard associative learning
(Gallistell et al., 2004), at least
as defined by the Rescorla
Wagner model.
The authors used the state-
space model to compute
learning curves for each indi-
vidual participant. These par-
ticipant-specific estimates of
the probability of success
were then regressed against
the blood oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) signal
acquired during fMRI. This
analysis revealed a typical
‘‘value prediction network’’
(Kable and Glimcher, 2009)—
vmPFC was prominent but
there were also significant effects
in posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and
ventral striatum. These findings are some-
what unsurprising because success was
associated with monetary reward, so the
probability of success regressor is likely
to have been correlated with the relative
value of the chosen response (i.e., the ex-
pected value associated with the chosen
response relative to the expected value
associated with the unchosen response;
Boorman et al., 2009; Daw et al., 2006).
In addition to these regions, however,
effects were also found in the medial
temporal lobe, in the amygdala and para-
hippocampal cortex, regions not typically
linked with value-based decision making.
Traditionally associated with memory,
parahippocampal cortical activation may
reflect the acquisition of the associative
knowledge which is a crucial basis for
the decisions the subjects make.
To assess the degree of conceptual
knowledge acquired at different stages
of the initial learning session, learning trial
blocks were interspersed with probe trial
blocks on which participants had to
make weather predictions and indicate
their level of certainty (i.e., sure [R90%
confident] or not sure [<90% confident])
based only on partial patterns in which
one of the two fractals was occluded.
On half of these trials, the correct
response could only be predicted on the
basis of the appropriate conceptual rule,
but not on the basis of each individual
pattern. On the other half, the outcome
Figure 1. Hippocampal FormationConnectivitywith vmPFCandPCC
Left: group overlay of voxels with a high probability of interconnection with the
hippocampus from a diffusion weighted imaging study. Right: connectivity
fingerprint shows the relative connection probability between the hippocampal
formation and nine subdivisions of cingulate and vmPFC. Voxels with the high-
est probability of connection with the hippocampal formation were found in
ventromedial (clusters 1 and 2) and posterior cingulate (clusters 7 and 8) cortex
rather than cingulate, midcingulate, and cingulate motor regions (clusters 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, and 9). The pattern of connectivity resembles the pattern of activation
found in vmPFC andPCC relating to probe trial performance in the study by Ku-
maran et al., (2009). Adapted from Beckmann et al., (2009).722 Neuron 63, September 24, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.
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Previewscould not be predicted by the conceptual
rule or any other information (50% sun,
50% rain). Importantly, no feedback was
provided on probe trials, thereby mini-
mizing the opportunity for additional
learning. Probe trial performance was
then regressed against the BOLD
response acquired during initial learning
session trials in a second general linear
model (GLM). Importantly, the probability
of success regressor was included in the
GLM alongside the orthogonalized probe
trial performance regressor, meaning
that the analysis would identify regions
that track probe trial performance above
and beyond successful performance as
estimated by the state-space model.
This analysis revealed significant positive
correlations in the VMPFC, PCC, and
again a medial temporal lobe region—
the left hippocampus. However, as with
the first fMRI analysis, different regions
may correlate with the task regressor for
different reasons. The left hippocampus
may be increasingly recruited as concep-
tual knowledge emerges and is deployed,
possibly independently of its value. By
contrast, the vmPFC and PCC may
encode the added value attributable to
the emergence of conceptual knowledge.
This latter interpretation is supported by
the behavioral finding that probe trial
performance predicted correct choices
(which deterministically yielded rewards)
on initial learning session trials even after
the effect of successful performance as
estimated by the state-space model had
been partialled out.
One point to note is that the activity re-
corded in the hippocampus might better
be described as learning-dependent
activity rather than learning-selective
activity (Wise and Murray, 2000). Activity
in the hippocampus was highest not
during learning but after learning when
the knowledge acquired was being ex-
ploited. Investigating learning-selective
activity, activity that is strongest when
learning is greatest and weakest once
learning is complete, during concep-
tual learning may be one fruitful avenue
for future research.
Next, Kumaran and colleagues (2009)
tested whether the left hippocampus
interacts with either the vmPFC or PCC,
depending on the level of conceptualknowledge as measured by probe trial
performance. Although the interconnec-
tions between vmPFC and brain regions
associated with reward, such as the
ventral striatum, have recently been
emphasized, it is the case that both PCC
and vmPFC are distinguished by their
connections with the hippocampal forma-
tion in monkeys (Ongur et al., 2003; Par-
vizi et al., 2006) and humans (Beckmann
et al., 2009; Figure 1). This elegant anal-
ysis revealed that functional coupling
between the left hippocampus and
vmPFC, but not PCC, strengthened as
the level of conceptual knowledge
grew. The finding casts new light on the
functional significance of the medial-
temporal-ventromedial prefrontal anat-
omical pathway, suggesting that these
regions interact when conceptual infor-
mation is increasingly deployed to make
value-based decisions, a frequent occur-
rence outside of the laboratory.
Finally, one of the key features of a
conceptual representation is that it can
be generalized to a novel setting. Behav-
iorally, participants exhibited a clear per-
formance enhancement in a new learning
session, when compared to the initial
learning session, in which participants
were faced with entirely novel fractal
stimuli but where performance benefited
from deployment of the same conceptual
rules. Across participants, the effect size
in the hippocampus during the initial
learning session predicted the degree of
performance enhancement in the novel
setting, further implicating the hippo-
campus specifically in the flexible deploy-
ment of conceptual knowledge.
While comparatively little is known of
the functions of the vmPFC, as distinct
from the rest of the adjacent orbitofrontal
cortex, in other species, a rich body of
work implicates the hippocampus in
both rats and monkeys in learning the
associations and relationships between
diverse events (Eichenbaum, 2004; Wirth
et al., 2003) such as their relative temporal
occurrence or spatial position (Charles
et al., 2004). Such processes may be
precursors to the conceptual representa-
tions examined by Kumaran et al. (2009).
An important question for future research
will be to go beyond asking whether or not
amnesic patients are able to acquire infor-Neuron 63,mation, whether of a semantic nature or
not, and to ask instead how they extrapo-
late from the knowledge they do have.
Empiricists have long argued that rather
than reflecting universal truths revealed
by reason, concepts originate from a dis-
tillation of perceptual experience. What-
ever the origin, the findings by Kumaran
et al. (2009) offer fresh insights into the
neural mechanisms behind the emer-
gence and exploitation of conceptual
knowledge. Namely, they implicate the
interaction between the hippocampus
and vmPFC in abstracting and using
conceptual knowledge from experience
to guide value-based choice and the
hippocampus in generalization to percep-
tually novel environments.
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